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OF SPEECH AND PRESS:
POPE V. ILLINOIS
ICHARD Pope and Charles G. Morrison worked as sales attendants
in different adult bookstores' in Rockford, Illinois. On July 21, 1983,
Rockford Police Department detectives purchased magazines from
Pope and Morrison, the on-duty attendants at the two stores. The police
later arrested the two men and charged each with violating the Illinois ob-
scenity statute. 2
Prior to their separate trials in an Illinois circuit court, Pope and Morri-
son filed motions to dismiss the charges, claiming the obscenity statute vio-
lated the first 3  and fourteenth4  amendments to the United States
Constitution. The trial court denied each of the motions. After a two-day
trial, a jury convicted Morrison on three counts of obscenity.5 The court
1. Exterior signs at both stores identified them as adult book stores. A large sign outside
the store where Morrison was employed claimed that the store contained "The Largest Selec-
tion of Adult Merchandise in Northern Illinois." Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1929, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 439, 455 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The two stores were open only to patrons who
were at least 18 years of age. Brief for Petitioners, Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 95 L. Ed.
2d 439 (1987) (No. 85-1973) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) [hereinafter Brief]. Owners
of the stores required all patrons to pay a fifty-cent browsing fee upon entering the stores.
People v. Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d 595, 597, 486 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1985); People v. Pope, 138
Ill. App. 3d 726, 732, 486 N.E.2d 350, 353 (1985).
2. The Illinois obscenity statute provides:
A person commits obscenity when, with knowledge of the nature or content
thereof, or recklessly failing to exercise reasonable inspection which would have
disclosed the nature or content thereof, he: (1) Sells, delivers or provides, or
offers or agrees to sell, deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture, record or
other representation or embodiment of the obscene ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); see infra note 12.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. The State called only two witnesses for the prosecution, the arresting detective and
another officer. The witnesses identified photographs of the book store. People v. Morrison,
138 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 486 N.E.2d at 347. For his defense, Morrison responded with two
witnesses, a college student and an expert in public opinion polls. Providing an indication of
the availability of the sexually oriented adult magazines, the college student testified that he
purchased comparable magazines in stores throughout Illinois. Id. An expert on public opin-
ion polling testified that a survey he conducted showed the general level of acceptance of sexu-
ally explicit material among Illinois adults. Id. at 597-98, 486 N.E.2d at 347.
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sentenced Morrison to twelve months conditional discharge and assessed a
fine of $1,500 plus court costs. 6 In a subsequent trial, a jury also convicted
Pope on three counts of obscenity. 7 The court then sentenced Pope to three
concurrent sentences of 120 days imprisonment and three consecutive fines
of $1,000.8
Over the defendant's objection in each trial, the Illinois court instructed
both juries to apply contemporary community standards to all three ele-
ments of the test9 for obscenity.I° Both Pope and Morrison submitted post-
trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The defendants
specifically objected to the application of a subjective contemporary commu-
nity standard, rather than an objective standard, to the third prong of the
obscenity test. 12
6. The initial violation of the obscenity statute is a Class A misdemeanor; second and
subsequent offenses are Class 4 felonies. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(d) (Smith-Hurd
1979 & Supp. 1987). The penalty for a Class A misdemeanor includes a fine of up to $1,000.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982). In addition, a court may impose a
sentence of "any term less than one year." Id., para. 1005-8-3(a)(1).
7. As in the Morrison trial, the State called only two witnesses: the arresting detective
and an officer to identify photographs of the book store. People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d at
732-33, 486 N.E.2d at 353. Pope responded with the same two defense witnesses called in the
Morrison case. Id. at 733-34, 486 N.E.2d at 354; see supra note 5. Two character witnesses,
Pope's mother and a long-time friend, testified during the sentencing hearing following convic-
tion. People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 734, 486 N.E.2d at 354.
8. See supra note 6. Pope apparently received a harsher sentence because he continued
to work at the book store. Prior to imposing Pope's sentence, the trial court commented: "I
believe there is a difference between Mr. Morrison and this gentleman. Mr. Morrison, if I
remember the testimony and sentencing, had left the employment and, I think, removed him-
self from the jurisdiction." People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 744, 486 N.E.2d at 361.
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Supreme Court set forth the three
elements of the test as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citations omitted).
10. The jury instruction defining obscenity read:
A thing is obscene if considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to a
prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excre-
tion, and, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in its descrip-
tion or representation of such matters; for example, by a patently offensive
description or representation of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual
or simulated, or by a patently offensive description or representation of mastur-
bation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the genitals, and, it is utterly
without redeeming social value.
In determining whether a thing is obscene, you are to consider how it would
be viewed by ordinary adults in the whole State of Illinois rather than by the
people in any single city or town or region within the State.
ILL. PArrERN JURY INSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL, No. 9.57 (2d ed. 1981).
11. People v. Pope, 138 I11. App. 3d at 731, 486 N.E.2d at 354; People v. Morrison, 138
I11. App. 3d at 597, 486 N.E.2d at 347; see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-2 (Smith-Hurd
1977).
12. Effective January 1, 1986, the Illinois Legislature amended the obscenity statute to
change the definition of obscene material. The former Illinois statute provided:
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to pruri-
ent interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion,
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Upon denial of their motions, both defendants appealed to the Illinois ap-
pellate court, which affirmed the convictions in written opinions 13 filed on
November 26, 1985. The appeals court thereafter denied the appellants' mo-
tions for rehearing. The two men attempted to appeal their cases to the
Illinois Supreme Court, but the court denied both Pope and Morrison leave
to appeal. Upon application, the United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari 14 and combined the two cases. 15 Held, vacated and remanded: The
first amendment value component of the Miller test 16 for obscenity must
employ a national objective standard, not derived from the preferences of
any given community, to determine whether literature lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 439 (1987).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBSCENITY STANDARDS
A. Early Censorship Efforts
Religious intolerance provided the historical basis for the regulation of
obscenity.' 7 Early censorship efforts spearheaded by the Roman Catholic
and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters. A thing is obscene even though the obscenity is
latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(b) (Smith-Hurd 1979) (current version at ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)). In People v. Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d 362,
321 N.E.2d 264, 268-69 (1974), the court construed the statute to also incorporate the third
part of the obscenity test proposed in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). For a
discussion of Memoirs, see infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
The recent amendments to the Illinois statute eliminated the application of community
standards to the third part of the obscenity test. The current Illinois statute provides:
Any material or performance is obscene if: (1) the average person, applying
contemporary adult community standards, would find that, taken as a whole, it
appeals to the prurient interest; and (2) the average person, applying contempo-
rary adult community standards, would find that it depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, ultimate sexual acts or sadomasochistic sexual acts,
whether normal or perverted, actual or simulated, or masturbation, excretory
functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals; and (3) taken as a whole, it lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
13. People v. Morrison, 138 Il. App. 3d 595, 486 N.E.2d 345 (1985); People v. Pope, 138
I11. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985). While affirming Pope's conviction, the court vacated
his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. People v. Pope, 138 11. App. 3d at 745,
486 N.E.2d at 362. The court consolidated the cases for oral argument.
14. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments of the states' highest
courts "where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States .... 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)
(1982).
15. See Sup. CT. R. 19-4 (authorizes consolidation of cases involving identical questions).
16. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
17. A. CRAIG, THE BANNED BOOKS OF ENGLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES, A STUDY
OF THE CONCEPTION OF LITERARY OBSCENITY 18 (1962). For a complete history of obscen-
ity regulation and censorship, see H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY, CENSOR-
SHIP IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 14-43 (1969); M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP, THE
SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE 3-132 (1964); F. LEWIS, LITERATURE, OBSCENITY & LAW 1-72
(1976); T. MURPHY, CENSORSHIP, GOVERNMENT AND OBSCENITY 41-51 (1963); N. ST.
JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 1-176 (1956); Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Ob-
scene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41-70 (1938). The text of many of the most prominent
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Church targeted blasphemy and heresy.18 Religious leaders were relatively
tolerant of sexual explicitness in drama and literature because such en-
tertainment was limited to elite classes. 19 The invention of the printing press
in the mid-fifteenth century, however, permitted persons of every social class
ready access to various types of literature. 20 Nevertheless, the church contin-
ued to tolerate bawdy literature 2' as long as the literature did not cast reli-
gion in an unfavorable light.22
In seventeenth century England sexually explicit works began to be sub-
jected to judicial and legislative censorship. 23 The common law courts, the
Court of Star Chamber, 24 and Acts of Parliament, including the Licensing
Act, 25 provided the principal mechanisms for English censorship. In 1663
an English court heard the first case involving obscenity unrelated to religion
or government. 26 The defendant was convicted of breaching the peace and
was assessed a fine and sentenced to a jail term. 27 Obscenity remained
largely unregulated by governmental entities and beyond the scope of the
obscenity cases from 1663 until 1966 are collected in E. DE GRAZIA, CENSORSHIP
LANDMARKS (1969).
18. See St. John-Stevas, The Church and Censorship in 'To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT..
ORIGINAL STUDIES IN THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF 'OBSCENITY' 89 (J. Chandos ed.
1962) (traces history of church censorship).
19. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 1 (1976) (examples of Aristophanes, Plautus,
Terence, and Juvenal in ancient times).
20. Id. at 2-3.
21. N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 17, at 5; see "The Miller's Tale" and "The Wife of
Bath" in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales.
22. A. CRAIG, supra note 17, at 18-19. The Roman Catholic Church banned certain
books on religious grounds. The church, however, permitted Boccaccio's Decameron to be
published when the author rewrote it by replacing sinning priests and nuns with sinning lay-
men. Id. at 19.
23. See id. at 19-22.
24. The Court of Star Chamber supplemented the common law courts and had authority
to take action when other courts could not or would not. G. ELTON, STAR CHAMBER STORIES
12 (1958). The Star Chamber was not bound by common law so it provided remedies not
available in other courts. Id. Henry VIII entrusted the control of books to the Star Chamber
in the early 16th century. A. CRAIG, supra note 17, at 19. As late as 1637, the Star Chamber
decreed that no books be imported into England without first being submitted to the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London. Id. at 20-21. The Star Chamber was abolished
in 1641. Id. at 13. For a further discussion of the Court of Star Chamber, see G. ELTON,
supra; J. Guy, THE CARDINAL'S COURT, THE IMPACT OF THOMAS WOLSEY IN STAR CHAM-
BER (1977); J. Guy, THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER AND ITS RECORDS TO THE REIGN OF
ELIZABETH I (1985); N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 17, at 6-13.
25. The English Parliament introduced licensing in 1643 after the demise of the Star
Chamber. A. CRAIG, supra note 17, at 21. Censorship, however, became more severe under
the Licensing Act of 1662, enacted to censor " 'heretical, seditious, schismatical or offensive
books or pamphlets'." Id. The Act forbade all printing without a license, granted censors the
power to search for and seize any unlicensed books, and limited to 20 the number of licensed
master printers. N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 17, at 15-16.
26. King v. Sedley, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (1663); also reported at 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1663).
Sedley, sometimes spelled Sidley or Sydlyes, became drunk, removed his clothes at a London
tavern, gave a profane speech, and poured bottles of urine on the audience. Although Sedley
involved indecent behavior, the case is regarded as the precursor to modern obscenity regula-
tion since it marks the first instance of government involvement in issues of public morality. 1
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 238 (1986); see also
Reynolds, Our Misplaced Reliance on Early Obscenity Cases, 61 A.B.A.J. 220, 220-21 (1975).
27. Sedley, 83 Eng. Rep. at 1146-47.
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courts 28 until 1727, however, when the Queen's Bench Court ruled that ob-
scenity constituted an independent crime.29
Censorship efforts in the American colonies paralleled those of England.
Accordingly, colonial activists initially focused on banning literature deemed
blasphemous or heretical, but allowed the publication and distribution of
secular sexual materials. 30 In response to an increase in bawdy literature,
however, a Massachusetts statute promulgated in 1711 prohibited the "com-
posing, writing, printing or publishing of any filthy, obscene or profane song,
pamphlet, libel or mock-sermon."'31
The first American conviction for obscenity was affirmed by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in 1815.32 Seven years later Vermont passed the
first obscenity statute exclusive of religious purposes. 33 Other states enacted
similar statutes.34 The federal government enacted its first obscenity law in
1842. 35 Despite the proliferation of obscenity laws, few prosecutions
ensued.36
Anti-obscenity regulation gained impetus under the leadership of
Anthony Comstock, 37 organizer of the New York Society for the Suppres-
28. See Queen v. Read, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (1708). In Read James Read was indicted for
publishing the book The Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead, but the Queen's Bench Court dis-
missed the indictment since the book did not "shak[e] religion." Id. at 953. The Court held
that obscenity itself was "punishable only in the Spiritual Court." Id.
29. Dominus Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727). Edmond Curl, sometimes spelled
Edmund Curll, was convicted of publishing the book Venus in the Cloister, or The Nun in Her
Smock. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. at 849. The book concerned lesbian love in a convent. F.
SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 5. The conviction was not based on religious grounds since the
anti-Catholic theme of the book increased its acceptance in England. Reynolds, supra note 26,
at 221. One judge in Curl argued that the book was acceptable specifically because of its anti-
Catholic nature. Id.
30. For a compilation of early obscenity statutes, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
482-83 n.12 (1957).
31. Acts and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, ch. CV, § 8 (1712), cited in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
32. Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815), cited in F. SCHAUER,
supra note 19, at 9. Jesse Sharpless was convicted of exhibiting a painting depicting a man and
woman in "an obscene, impudent, and indecent posture." Id. at 92 (emphasis omitted).
33. 1824 Vt. Laws ch. XXIII, No. 1, § 23, cited in F. SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 10.
34. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. § 182-184 (1830), cited in F. SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 10;
MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 130 § 10 (1835), cited in Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 n.13; N.H. REV. STAT.
221 (1843), cited in Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 n.13. For citations to early state laws concerning
profanity and obscenity, see Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 n.13.
35. 5 Stat. 566, § 28 (1842) (allowing the confiscation and destruction by customs authori-
ties of obscene pictures) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982)). The primary purpose of
the statute was to eliminate the importation of French postcards. F. SCHAUER, supra note 19,
at 10.
36. Some of the cases that did make it to the courts include: McJunkins v. State, 10 Ind.
140 (1858) (indecent and vulgar songs); Commonwealth v. Tarbox, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 66
(1848) (advertisement of contraception preventative); People v. Girardin, 1 Mich. 90 (1848)
(obscene newspaper); Britain v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 203 (1842) (slave owner convicted
for allowing slave in public without clothes).
37. See P. BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT: THE VICE-SOCIETY MOVEMENT AND BOOK CEN-
SORSHIP IN AMERICA 2 (1968). Comstock was a New England Congregationalist who moved
to New York after the Civil War. Alarmed by the nature of the books he saw, he helped to
arrest a seller of bawdy books in 1872. Id. Comstock soon formed his own vice commission,
finding support among such prominent persons as J.P. Morgan. M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 17, at 30. Comstock did not limit his scorn to obscenity; he also opposed gambling,
19871 NOTES 1027
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
sion of Vice. Consolidating the support of various judicial, executive, and
legislative leaders, 38 Comstock secured the passage of a federal law prohibit-
ing the mailing of obscene publications. The legislation became commonly
known as the Comstock Act.3 9 As special agent to the Post Office Depart-
ment, Comstock personally supervised the enforcement of the law.4°
In response to the passage of the Comstock Act and its fervent enforce-
ment,4 1 courts were compelled to formulate a definition of obscenity. In
United States v. Bennett 42 a federal court of appeals adopted a standard ini-
tially presented in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin.43 Specifically, the
court held that under the Hicklin standard, a jury could determine suspect
material obscene based on the effect selected passages would have on espe-
cially susceptible members of the population, such as the immature or men-
tally weak. 44 Several federal district courts also elected to adopt the Hicklin
obscenity standard. 45
Not all jurisdictions, however, favorably received the Hicklin standard.46
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the standard in Halsey v. New
York Society for Suppression of Vice.47 Three separate cases decided by the
lotteries, light literature, popular magazines, and weekly newspapers. F. SCHAUER, supra note
19, at 12 n.51. His slogan was "Morals, not Art or Literature." T. MURPHY, supra note 17, at
9. For a discussion of the life and work of Comstock, see P. BOYER, supra; H. BROUN & M.
LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK, ROUNDSMAN OF THE LORD (1927); M. ERNST & A.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 29-35. For a criticism of Comstock, see H.L. Mencken, Com-
stockery, in THE FIRST FREEDOM 276 (R. Downs ed. 1960).
38. Justice Strong of the United States Supreme Court drafted the bill for Comstock to
present to Congress. F. SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 13.
39. 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982)).
40. M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 33. A portion of the fines collected
went to Comstock or his New York Society. Id.
41. In the first year, Comstock claimed to have seized: 194,000 pictures; 134,000 pounds
of books; 5,500 decks of cards; 14,200 stereo plates; 60,300 rubber articles (mostly contracep-
tives); and 31,150 boxes of pills and powders ("aphrodisiacs"). Id. Before his death in 1915,
Comstock claimed to have convicted more than 3,600 persons and destroyed 160 tons of ob-
scene literature. F. SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 13. Comstock also took credit for at least 15
suicides. R. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA, PATTERNS OF CENSORSHIP AND CON-
TROL 20 (1960).
42. 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571) (affirming conviction under 19
Stat. 90 (1876) for use of mail to distribute obscene book entitled Cupids Yokes or The Binding
Forces of Conjugal Life).
43. [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360.
44. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1104 (quoting Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Males, 51 F. 41, 42 (D. Ind. 1892); United States v. Smith,
45 F. 476, 477 (E.D. Wis. 1891); United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414, 417 (D. Kan. 1891);
United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733 (E.D. Mo. 1889); United States v. Wightman, 29 F.
636, 637 (W.D. Penn. 1886); United States v. Bebout, 28 F. 522, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1886); United
States v. Britton, 17 F. 731, 733 (S.D. Ohio 1883). The Supreme Court also seemed to favor
the Hicklin rule. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500-01 (1897); Rosen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1896).
46. See Konda v. United States, 166 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1908). "[W]hen [excerpts were] taken
from their settings and deprived of the support of their full context, it may be that they did not
fairly represent the character of the work." Id. at 92; see also United States v. Kennerly, 209
F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J. Learned) (applying, but disapproving of, Hicklin
standard).
47. 234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219 (1922).
No work may be judged from a selection of... paragraphs alone. Printed by
themselves they might, as a matter of law, come within the prohibition of the
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1930s also rejected the Hicklin stan-
dard.48 In its place, the Second Circuit adopted a standard that judged ob-
scenity by the dominant effect of the suspect work on the average person in
the community. 49
In response to the position taken by the Second Circuit, 50 most courts
accepted the dominant effect standard. 5 1 A significant number of jurisdic-
tions, however, retained the traditional Hicklin rule. 52 The discrepancy be-
tween the standards for determining obscenity persisted until the Supreme
Court resolved the issue. 53
B. Roth v. United States
In 1957 the Supreme Court began its long struggle with the regulation of
obscenity in Roth v. United States.54 Writing for the majority, Justice Bren-
nan reasoned that constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press
statute. So might a similar selection from Aristophanes or Chaucer or Boccac-
cio, or even from the Bible. The book, however, must be considered broadly, as
a whole.
136 N.E. at 220.
48. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J., Learned); United
States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J., Augustus)
(affirming trial court decision that James Joyce's book was serious literary effort); United
States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J., Augustus).
49. Levine, 83 F.2d at 157. "[W]hat counts is its effect, not upon any particular class, but
upon all those whom it is likely to reach." Id. "[T]he book must be taken as a whole .... "
Id. at 158. "The standard must be the likelihood that the work will so arouse the salacity of
the reader to whom it is sent as to outweigh any literary, scientific or other merits it may have
.... " Id. Learned Hand's opinions in Kennerly and Levine set out essentially the same tests
adopted by the Supreme Court many years later. For an analysis of the decisions and their
effect on later Supreme Court rulings, see THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECI-
SIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND 29-37 (H. Shanks ed. 1968).
50. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
51. See American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 I11. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585
(1954) (appeal from injunction against city's enforcement of ordinance preventing exhibition of
film remanded to trial court to determine whether motion picture obscene (citing series of
cases in which courts adopted dominant effect standard)).
52. See Barstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Two
Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'dsub nom. Besig v. United States,
208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) (books were Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn, both by
Henry Miller); United States v. Goldstein, 73 F. Supp. 875, 877 (D.N.J. 1947); United States v.
Barlow, 56 F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (C.D. Utah), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 805 (1944); King v.
Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 741, 233 S.W.2d 522, 524 (1950); State v. Becker, 272 S.W.2d 283,
285 (Mo. 1954). For a discussion of later attempts to censor Henry Miller's work, see E.
HUTCHISON, TROPIC OF CANCER ON TRIAL, A CASE HISTORY OF CENSORSHIP (1968).
53. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For a discussion of Roth, see infra
notes 54-71 and accompanying text. The Court failed to reconcile the conflicting lower court
obscenity standards in Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (Frankfurter J.,
not participating) (court evenly split on proper standard for obscenity), aff'g per curiam, 297
N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947).
54. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth was convicted in a federal district court in New York for
mailing obscene material in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Id. at 476. In a combined
case, another man was convicted under the California obscenity statute. Id. See generally
Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity. The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960) (calling Roth test inadequate and misleading); Note, The Supreme




do not protect obscenity.55 The Court based its determination on the prem-
ise that the first amendment does not defend obscenity 56 because obscenity
lacks redeeming social importance.5 7
In a decision that essentially labeled obscenity a lower form of speech, 58
the Roth Court also attempted to provide an obscenity standard for litera-
ture.59 The Court recognized the division among the lower courts concern-
ing the proper definition of obscenity. 60 The Court ruled that the Hicklin
standard was too restrictive in light of the constitutional guarantees of free-
dom in speech and press. 61 Accordingly, the Court adopted a variation of
the dominant effect standard. 62 The Roth standard asks "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. ' '63
In formulating its definition of obscenity, the Court hastened to identify
the distinction between obscenity and sex.64 Sex, according to the Court, is
not only a subject of human interest, but a matter of vital public concern. 65
Because of its significant public interest, the Roth Court ruled that the first
amendment protects sex portrayed in works of art, literature, and science so
long as the sex depicted is not obscene.66
In Roth the Court specified several criteria for judging whether literature
is obscene. First, the material must be judged by its impact on the average
person. 67 Second, the material must be judged on the basis of its dominant
55. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
56. In previous first amendment decisions, the Court used a balancing approach that
weighed the government's interest in restricting expression against the constitutional guaran-
tees of free speech and press. Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty.- Explicit Sex and
the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 537-38 (1975). The Court attempted to discern
whether the harm threatened by the expression under scrutiny outweighed the interest in free
expression of that type. Id. at 538. The Court in Roth decided that the first amendment was
not designed to protect every utterance; therefore no weighing of rights was necessary. Roth,
354 U.S. at 483.
57. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
58. The Court addressed the obscenity issue in dicta in previous cases involving other
speech-related issues. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (preven-
tion and punishment of lewd and obscene speech never raised constitutional problem); Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (obscene speech not protected by clear and present
danger standard). For a further discussion of unprotected speech, see Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 602-08.
59. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488. "It is ... vital that the standards for judging obscenity safe-
guard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest." Id.
60. Id. at 489.




64. Id. at 487.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 488.
67. For a discussion of who is the "average person," see Bell, Determining Community
Standards, 63 A.B.A.J. 1202, 1204-06 (1977). Bell argues that the average person might have
a variety of meanings beyond just the normal or typical individual. Id. at 1204. One could
define average as the mean average of various statistical data. Id. Alternatively, average could
indicate a median average, with an individual representing the midpoint in a range of statistical
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theme.68 Finally, the material must be found to "appeal to the prurient inter-
est."' 69 The Court ruled that the obscenity inquiry should be conducted with
reference to contemporary community standards. Unfortunately, the Court
failed to specify the boundaries of the community to be used in applying
contemporary community standards. In fact, the Court appeared to ignore
first amendment values in its test. 70 The Court refused to directly address
these issues for nearly a decade. 71
C. Memoirs v. Massachusetts
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts72 the Supreme Court modified the Roth stan-
dard in two significant respects. 73 Memoirs concerned a conviction for dis-
tributing the book John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, more
popularly known as Fanny Hill.7 4 Justice Brennan's opinion divided the
Roth standard into three independent tests that must be satisfied to find ma-
data with half the people having the characteristic below and half above the average person.
Id. Finally, average could indicate a modal average, like "most people." Bell reasons that a
modal individual would be that person who shares the views of at least 75 percent of the
population. Id. If there is not 75 percent agreement, then there is no single average person.
Id. at 1205.
68. Several courts rejected the Hicklin practice of judging a work by isolated passages.
See Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945); People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 959, 178 P.2d 853, 855 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1947); Attorney General v. Book
Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1948); see also cases cited
supra notes 46-48. The Roth court, in contrast, rejected the Hicklin standard on constitutional
grounds. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89; see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 54, at 88-89.
69. The Court defined "prurient" as "having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Roth,
354 U.S. at 487 n.20. A few months earlier, the American Law Institute proposed to define the
same term as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion .... MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), cited in Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. Justice
Brennan stated for the majority, "We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of
obscenity developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code ..
Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. Contra id. at 498-500 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. See Lockhart, supra note 56, at 541.
71. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), four Justices divided equally on whether
local or national standards should determine community standards. Nudist magazines, how-
ever, did receive recognition as deserving constitutional protection. Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam) (conviction reversed); Mounce v. United
States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957) (per curiam) (judgment vacated and case remanded). In addition,
the court also afforded protection for a magazine for homosexuals. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355
U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) (conviction reversed).
72. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (popularly known as Memoirs v. Massachusetts).
73. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
74. John Cleland wrote Fanny Hill in 1748. Although no one attempted to suppress the
book when first published in England, periodic efforts at censorship were made after its initial
publication. One of the earliest American obscenity cases concerned Fanny Hill. See Com-
monwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). Shortly before the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts found Fanny Hill obscene in Attorney General v. A Book Named "John Cle-
land's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403, 406 (1965), courts in
two other states also considered the book. New York found Fanny Hill not obscene. Larkin v.
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 403-04, 200 N.E.2d 760, 762-63, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71, 74-75
(1964). New Jersey, however, found Fanny Hill obscene. G.P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86




terial obscene and beyond constitutional protection. 75
The Court retained the central criterion for obscenity in Roth as its first
test for obscenity in Memoirs. Specifically, the Court required that the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal to prurient interests.76
Proposed in an earlier opinion determining the obscenity of material under a
modern version of the Comstock Act,77 the second test for obscenity advo-
cated by the Memoirs Court required an evaluation of the patent offensive-
ness of suspect material.7 8 According to Justice Brennan, obscene material
is patently offensive because it insults contemporary community standards
relating to the depiction of sexual matters. 79 The third test in Memoirs pro-
vided that to be obscene the material must be "utterly without redeeming
social value." °80 Since the Massachusetts state court determined Fanny Hill
contained a minimum amount of social value, 81 the Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's determination that the book was obscene.8 2 Although only
three Justices regarded the social value element as conclusive, the ideological
composition of the Court8 3 effectively solidified the social value test as a
75. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418-19.
76. Id. at 418.
77. See Manual Enters. Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (Harlan, J., joined by Stew-
art, J.) (reverses Post Office Department's ban of shipment of magazines under Comstock Act).
Justices Harlan and Stewart proposed a "patent offensiveness" test to rescue literature appeal-
ing to prurient interest, but still considered of value. Id. at 487.
78. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
79. Id.
80. Id. The test came from Brennan's Roth opinion, holding that the first amendment did
not protect literature "utterly without redeeming social importance." Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
81. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 420. The state court indicated that testimony showed "this book
has some minimal literary value .... Attorney General v. A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 349 Mass. 69, 73, 206 N.E. 2d 403, 406 (1965).
82. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas joined Justice
Brennan's opinion. Id. at 414. Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred in the result,
but not the opinion. Id. at 421, 424. For Justice Black's reasoning, see Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,
515 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black believed the first amendment forbade all gov-
ernmental censorship or regulation of speech and press. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 481 (Black, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Black, however, government could regulate conduct.
Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). For Justice Douglas's reasoning, see Memoirs,
383 U.S. at 424 (Douglas, J., concurring). "[T]he first amendment leaves no power in govern-
ment over expression of ideas." Id. at 433 (emphasis in original). For Justice Stewart's reason-
ing, see Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Mishkin, 303 U.S. at 518 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Stewart believed government could not suppress anything short of hard-
core pornography. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 499 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Clark, Harlan,
and White dissented. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 441, 455, 460 (dissenting opinions). Justice Clark
rejected the "utterly without redeeming social importance" test. Id. at 443 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Harlan asserted that the federal government could only regulate hard-core por-
nography, but that the states were free to be more restrictive. Id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice White also claimed that the states were not bound by the first amendment.
Id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, however, criticized the "social importance"
test as failing to consider the dominant theme of the book. Id. at 461 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas followed the Memoirs test.
Justices Black and Douglas consistently voted against any restrictions on first amendment
freedoms. See, e.g., Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431, 436 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Stewart limited obscenity to what he
1032 [Vol. 41
component of the obscenity analysis. The Memoirs standard remained the
relevant obscenity standard for the next seven years.8 4 During the several
years following Memoirs, the Court reversed per curiam8 5 all of the obscen-
ity convictions it reviewed involving the distribution of sexual material to
adults,8 6 except certain pictorial depictions of explicit sexual activity.
8 7
D. Miller v. California
A restructuring of the Court8 8 finally enabled a five-Justice majority8 9 to
agree on a modified standard separating obscenity from constitutionally pro-
tected sexual matter in Miller v. California.90 Chief Justice Burger's major-
ity opinion in Miller9' retained a three-prong test for obscenity.9 2 The
called "hard core pornography." For Justice Stewart's definition of hard core pornography,
see Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 499 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For an alternative definition of hard
core pornography, see THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRA-
PHY 18 (1970). Justice Harlan concurred with Justice Stewart in matters of federal law. For
Justice Harlan's view, see his dissent in Roth, 354 U.S. at 503-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. For further analysis of Memoirs, see Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Press-
Obscenity Standards, 31 ALB. L. REV. 143 (1967); Note, Ginzburg et aL-An Attack on Free-
dom of Expression, 17 W. RESERVE L. REV. 1325 (1966); Note, More Ado About Dirty Books,
75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966). For a discussion and analysis of Memoirs by the defendant's attor-
ney, see C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY (1968). The oral arguments of Memoirs, Ginz-
burg, and Mishkin plus other cases are collected in OBSCENITY, THE COMPLETE ORAL
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN THE MAJOR OBSCENITY CASES (L. Friedman
ed. 1970).
85. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (summarizes different ap-
proaches used by Justices to evaluate whether or not suspect material was obscene). The diver-
gence of opinions among the Justices made it impossible to render a majority opinion. Later
cases merely cited Redrup as controlling. See Wiener v. California, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Bloss
v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1969); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967).
86. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 n.8 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (citing thirty-one cases decided between 1967 and 1971). For an analysis of the cases by
the type of suspect material, see Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 397-401 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
87. See, e.g., Levin v. Maryland, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968) (denying certiorari to conviction
for illegal sale of obscene photographs); G.I. Distributors, Inc. v. New York, 389 U.S. 905
(1967) (denying certiorari to appeals court determination that seventy-page pamphlet contain-
ing photos of males engaging in sex was obscene under New York obscenity statute); Landau
v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967) (holding film "Chant D'Amour" obscene), aff'g per curiam,
245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1966); Phelper v. Texas, 382 U.S. 943 (1965) (deny-
ing certiorari to conviction for possession of obscene photographs).
88. See A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 283-93 (1979). In
1969 President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger to replace Chief Justice Warren. Id. at
287. By 1973 Nixon had made three more appointments to the Court. Justice Blackmun
replaced Justice Fortas in 1970, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist replaced Justices Black and
Harlan in 1972. Id. at 288-93.
89. The majority consisted of the four Nixon appointees and Justice White.
90. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
91. The Court issued five related obscenity opinions on June 21, 1973. In addition to
Miller, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973) (addressing question of
consenting adults); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 118 (1973) (verbal descriptions of sex-
ual activity without pictures); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128
(1973) (importation of obscene materials for private use); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139,
142 (1973) (interstate transportation of films). See generally Fahringer & Brown, The Rise and
Fall of Roth-A Critique of the Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L.J. 731
(1974) (criticizing Miller as restriction on first amendment rights); Hunsaker, The 1973 Ob-
scenity-Pornography Decisions. Analysis, Impact, and Legislative Alternatives, 22 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 906 (1974) (criticizing Miller test as experiment in "New Federalism"); Note, Com-
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Court, however, significantly changed the third component of the Memoirs
standard. 9
3
The Miller obscenity analysis continued to inquire whether the material
under scrutiny contained the requisite prurient appeal 94 and whether the
work depicted sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner. 95 The Miller
Court, however, specifically rejected the "utterly without redeeming social
value" test used in Memoirs.96 In place of the Memoirs value test, the Miller
Court required the trier of fact to determine if a suspect work as a whole
lacked the value deserving of constitutional protection. 97 According to the
Court, the first amendment protects the exchange of ideas relating to polit-
ical and social change, but not the depiction of sex for mere titillation or for
profit.98 Thus, the Court added a first amendment test for obscenity.
The Miller Court also clarified the definition of community standards. 99
Chief Justice Burger specifically stated that, in order to avoid hypothetical
determinations, the relevant community should not attempt to encompass
the nation as a whole. 100 On the contrary, the Miller Court expressly upheld
the use of a state-wide standard.10 1 In subsequent decisions, the Court fur-
ther clarified its definition of community. Specifically, the Court ruled that
the relevant community may be less than statewide,102 and that a state may
elect not to specify a particular geographic community.10 3
munity Standards, Class Actions and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1838 (1975) (criticizing Miller as deterrence to distribution of serious works); Note, Miller v.
California: A Cold Shower for the First Amendment, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 568 (1974) (identi-
fying Miller test as effort to give police power to deter dissemination of obscenity).
92. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
93. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
94. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 24-25. "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitution-
ally redeem an otherwise obscene publication ...." Id. at 25 n.7 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin,
408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972)).
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id. at 34-36.
99. Judge Learned Hand offered the first definition of contemporary community stan-
dards. Judge Hand characterized the standard as "the average conscience of the time."
United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). For a further discussion of the
concept of contemporary community standards, see Bell, supra note 67, at 1202 (1977) (pro-
posing public opinion polling determine community standards); Schauer, Reflections on "Con-
temporary Community Standards: The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of
Obscenity, 56 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1978) (tracing community standards to flawed analysis of early
case law); Shugrue & Zieg, An Atlas for Obscenity Exploring Community Standards, 7
CREIGHTON L. REV. 157 (1974) (criticizing community standards as leading to inconsistency
in law); Note, Community Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1277 (1978)
(identifying community standards as limit on judicial control of obscenity); Note, Community
Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838
(1975) (criticizing community standards as threat to first amendment); Comment, The Geogra-
phy of Obscenity's "Contemporary Community Standards," 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 (1971)
(analyzing community standards as defined by various courts).
100. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-31.
101. Id. at 33-34.
102. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974) (national community standard not
required in federal obscenity prosecutions); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974)
(Court sanctioned use of smaller than statewide community).
103. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 157 (states may choose whether or not to specify community).
1034 [Vol. 41
After the Miller decision, a question remained as to which of the three
prongs of the obscenity test were subject to the community standards deter-
mination. The contemporary community standard undoubtedly applied to
the first prong, which specifically mentioned that standard. °4 Furthermore,
while the Miller court implied that the same community standard may apply
to the second prong, 10 5 in Smith v. United States 106 the Court clearly stated
that courts must judge both prurient interest and patent offensiveness ac-
cording to community standards. 0 7 Until recently, however, the applicabil-
ity of the community standards determination related to the first amendment
value prong of the Miller test remained in dispute.
II. POPE V ILLINOIS
A. Defining the Issue
Following the development of the three-prong Miller test for obscenity, 108
the Supreme Court emphasized that the first two prongs of the test depended
on community standards. 0 9 The Court, however, failed to rule on the stan-
dard applicable to the third prong of the test. Several federal circuit courts
held that community standards were not applicable to the first amendment
value test." 0 Obscenity legislation in several states has followed the same
reasoning."I On the other hand, obscenity legislation in certain states ap-
plies community standards to all three components of the obscenity test." 12
The remaining states have avoided a legislative resolution of the issue by
enacting statutes that substantially reproduce the Miller test.' 1 3
104. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
105. Id. at 33.
106. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
107. Id. at 301-02.
108. See supra note 9.
109. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 464 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1165 (1985); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 835 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1047 (1983); Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1363 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1977).
111. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3501 (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT § 18-7-101(2)
(1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, para. 20(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 728.4 (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-103 (Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-27.1-01 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-260 (Law Co-op. 1985); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 43.21(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. § 6-4-301 (1983). But see Goldstein v.
Allain, 568 F. Supp. 1377, 1387 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (preliminary injunction to prevent enforce-
ment of statute). South Dakota applies community standards specifically to the "patently of-
fensive" test, but does not refer to the standard in the "prurient interest" test. See S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-27(10) (1979).
112. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-193(a) (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4301(3)(a) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.010(9) (Vernon Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE
61-8A-1(7) (1984).
113. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-150 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3585.1(4) (Supp. 1985);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 7201 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001(7) (West Supp.
1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101(b) (Harrison 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1210(6)
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-4101(2) (1987); IND. CODE § 35-49-2-1 (1985); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 531.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106(3) (West
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2912(2)(B) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§ 31 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.362(5) (West Supp. 1987); MINN.
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The Illinois appellate court that considered the convictions of Pope and
Morrison held that courts may apply community standards to the first
amendment value test since the Supreme Court had not issued a ruling to the
contrary. 114 Pope v. Illlinois115 presented the Court with the opportunity to
clarify the applicability of contemporary community standards to the third
element of the Miller obscenity test. Justice White, writing for the majority,
based the opinion on two premises. First, prior cases provided clear guidance
for the resolution of the issue.1 16 Second, the existence of serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value does not vary from community to com-
munity. 117 In a concurring opinion Justice Scalia agreed with the interpreta-
tion of Miller offered by the majority.' 18 In a dissent joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens criticized the majority opinion for
failing to follow the guidelines of the first amendment.1 19
B. Adding Reasonableness to Obscenity
The majority began its analysis in Pope by asserting that the Court had
never previously suggested that community standards should be applied to
the first amendment value test. 120 The Court conceded that the lower courts
may have misinterpreted Smith, 121 in which the Court pointed out that, un-
like the first two prongs of the obscenity test, Miller did not discuss value in
terms of contemporary community standards. 122 The Court held that Smith
did not indicate an oversight in the Miller test, but constituted a clear and
deliberate decision to exclude the application of community standards in the
value test. 123
In delineating the boundaries of the relevant community, the majority fur-
ther reasoned that the standards of a single community could not be used to
STAT. ANN. § 617.241 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-201 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-807(9) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.235(4) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650:1
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-2 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-38-1(B) (1987);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b) (Supp.
1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5903(b) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-1 (1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-1101(5) (1982). Oklahoma applies contemporary community stan-
dards to the "prurient interest" test, but does not mention the remaining tests in its statute.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1040.12 (West 1983). Four states, Alaska, Maryland, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin, provide no statutory definition of obscenity.
114. In both cases the court stated that "the United States Supreme Court has never held
that an objective standard as opposed to a community one should be applied in adjudging if
materials are 'utterly without redeeming social value.' " People v. Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d
595, 600, 486 N.E.2d 345, 349 (1985); People v. Pope, 138 I11. App. 3d 726, 735, 486 N.E.2d
350, 355 (1985).
115. 107 S. Ct. 1918, 95 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1987).
116. Id. at 1920, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445.
117. Id. at 1921, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445.
118. Id. at 1923, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 448.
119. Id. at 1924, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 449.
120. Id. at 1920, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445.
121. Id. at 1921, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445 (citing Smith, 431 U.S. 291 (1977)).
122. Smith, 431 U.S. at 301 (citing F. SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 123-24).
123. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445; see also 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 259 n.36 (1986) (Smith decision interprets
third prong of Miller test as requiring application of national, not local, community standards).
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determine whether the literary, artistic, political, or scientific value of any
material deserved first amendment protection. 124  The Court stated that the
first amendment provides protection to any work of merit. 125 Justice White
added that first amendment value neither results from majority approval nor
varies from community to community based on local acceptance. 12
6
The Court ruled that the "reasonable person" standard constituted an ap-
propriate method for determining whether suspect material contains
merit. 127 The majority dismissed the possibility that the objective standard
might promote confusion by explaining that an objective obscenity standard
should present no greater dilemma than the reasonable person tort stan-
dard. 128 Based on precedent and pragmatic appraisal of the relevant com-
munity, the Supreme Court, therefore, ruled the jury instruction 129 given in
the trials of Pope and Morrison unconstitutional.
130
C. A Call for Reexamination of Miller
In his concurring opinion Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's determi-
nation that a court should determine value using a reasonable person stan-
dard, 131 but he confined his agreement to the limits of the issue presented to
the Court.132 Although the standard adopted by the Court for the value test
remained consistent with Miller, Justice Scalia asserted that the Miller test is
fundamentally flawed.133 Justice Scalia further asserted that the reasonable
person standard provided an inappropriate method for determining the
value of art or literature since beauty and taste have nothing to do with
reason.134 Accordingly, Justice Scalia called for a reconsideration of the
Miller test.135 Justice Scalia failed to indicate, however, what test he would
favor to replace Miller. Indeed, his approach to the Miller test appeared to
124. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445.
125. Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1921 n.3, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445 n.3.
129. See supra note 10.
130. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445. Instead of reversing the convictions, the
Court remanded the cases to the Illinois appellate court to consider if the faulty jury instruc-
tions amounted to harmless error. See id. at 1921-23, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 445-47. Justice Black-
mun concurred in the portion of the majority opinion concerning the reasonable person
standard, but dissented on the harmless error issue. Id. at 1923-24, 95 L. Ed. at 448-49.
131. Id. at 1923, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 448.
132. Id. The issue was stated as follows: "Whether contemporary community standards
are to be applied to the value element of the tripartite test for obscenity articulated in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)." Brief, supra note 1.
133. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1923, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 448.
134. Id. Justice Scalia said the reasonable man would be better identified as a "man of
tolerably good taste." Id. ("De gustibus non est disputandum" means taste cannot be
disputed).
135. Id. The November 24, 1987, decision by the Federal Communications Commission to
allow late night television broadcasting of indecent, but not obscene, programming illustrates
the confusion caused by the Miller test. The Dallas Morning News, Nov. 26, 1987, § A, at 33,
col. 2. The FCC defined indecent programming as "material that depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast me-
dium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Id. at 33-35. Compare this definition with the
first two prongs of the Miller obscenity test. See supra note 9.
1987] NOTES 1037
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
question whether courts should properly determine the value of artistic
works. 136
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion also expressed concern about the ef-
fect of using a reasonable person standard to judge first amendment value. 137
The dissent reasoned that reasonable persons could possibly disagree in their
appraisal of the value of pornographic material. 138 According to Justice Ste-'
vens, the majority's standard would still allow a jury to use community stan-
dards to determine value, even though jury instructions could not specify
such a standard. 139 The dissent added that the reasonable person standard
could result in a subjective, rather than an objective, determination of first
amendment value as juries tend to base decisions on the perceived viewpoint
of the majority of persons in the community. 140 Justice Stevens concluded
that if any reasonable person could find value in the suspect material, then
the first amendment must provide protection. 141
In the second portion of their analysis of the Pope and Morrison obscenity
convictions, the dissenting Justices reaffirmed their position that possession
or sale of obscene materials should not be prohibited or criminalized among
consenting adults. 142 Justice Stevens argued that the general public, not the
courts or legislatures, should determine whether sexually oriented material
contains value. 143 The dissent also specifically criticized the vagueness and
enforcement of the Illinois statute. 144 The dissent reasoned that even if the
defendants knew the magazines they sold were pornographic, Pope and
Morrison likely did not know that the publications were legally obscene
since the state allowed their employers to operate and advertise the
136. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1923, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 448. "Just as there is no use arguing about
taste, there is no use litigating about it." Id.
137. Id. at 1927, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 452. Justice Stewart divided his opinion into three parts:
the first dealing with harmless error and the remaining two dealing with the obscenity issue.
Id. at 1924, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 449. Justice Blackmun joined only in the harmless error portion.
Id. at 1923, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 448. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined also with the obscenity
portions. Id. at 1924, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 449.
138. Id. at 1926, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 452 (quoting Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157
(1946)).
139. Id. at 1926, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 452. Unless the juror finds an ordinary member of his or
her community is not reasonable, community standards must apply. Id. at 1926 n.4, 95 L. Ed.
2d at 452 n.4; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 comment c (1965) (reason-
able man standard allows jury "to look to a community standard").
140. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1927, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 453.
141. Id. at 1927, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 452.
142. Id. at 1927, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 453; see Paris Adult Theatres I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-
84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-43 (1967), the
Court recognized that a state may regulate obscenity to protect children and unwilling viewers.
Four states set forth statutory definitions of obscenity only with respect to minors. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(F) (Anderson 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(11) (1978);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2801(6) (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.050 (1977).
143. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1930, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 457 (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 321 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).





In Pope v. Illinois the Supreme Court asserted that courts must use a na-
tional, not local, standard to determine the first amendment value of sexually
oriented material. Such value should not vary from community to commu-
nity based on the local level of acceptance. The Court held that a jury must
decide whether or not a reasonable person would find value in the material.
The concurring and dissenting opinions, especially the concurrence of Jus-
tice Scalia, however, signaled the need for a further modification of the
Miller obscenity test. The majority of the Pope Court supported the three-
prong Miller test. Justice Scalia's call for reconsideration of Miller, along
with the three dissenting justices' opposition to the test, however, created a
5-4 split on the matter. The recent retirement of Justice Powell, a supporter
of the test, vests the swing vote in his replacement, Justice Kennedy.
Even if the Court decides to completely reexamine Miller, no clear indica-
tion exists as to the direction the Court may pursue. A majority of the Court
may adhere to the Miller test either in its present form or in a modified form.
Alternatively, the Court may develop a new test. Finally, the Court may
reach an impasse reminiscent of the period between Memoirs and Miller,
when the Justices were unable to render majority decisions in either af-
firming or reversing obscenity convictions. Consequently, while Pope clari-
fies the first amendment value component of the Miller test, at the same time
the decision obscures the future of obscenity law.
Ronald D. Gray
145. Id. at 1929, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 454-55.
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